STAT

Administration of the Central Intelligence Agency

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. GEORGE H. MAHON
OF TEXAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, a distinguished journalist, William S. White, has written a very interesting article about the CIA and its Director, Adm. W. F. Raborn, which I feel should be included in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. Appearing in the Washington Post this morning, the article is as follows:

REORGANIZED CIA: MAKING USE OF OUTSIDE SKILLS

(By William S. White)

The highly secret Central Intelligence Agency is broadening its communication with Congress, with private American scientists, and with American industry.

Almost, indeed, it might be said that CIA is for the first time gingerly entering ordinary American life—or as much of that ordinary life as its unavoidably clandestine basic cast can possibly permit.

This, the most sensitive of the instrumentalities of the American Government in the cold war has not, of course, dropped and cannot drop its inherent cloak-and-dagger covering for some operations.

Within the limits of bedrock and unalterable security precautions, however, Adm. W. F. Raborn, its Director, has reorganized its whole inner structure and approach to make a wide use of outside skills and talents—and information—never before so widely available to CIA.

The production of scientific and technical intelligence, in consequence, has been immensely increased. This has been principally through the cooperation of world-famous American men of science who have been brought in as cleared consultants. Some American industrial concerns have made large direct contributions of their own.

That Raborn, a professional admiral yet, has become the chief of the CIA in order to liquidate some of its old passion for extreme apartness is not without its irony. When he took over "the Agency" there was much expressed fear that with a "military mind" at its head it would more and more tend to operate in darker and darker alleys.

The simple truth is that this has not happened. Nor has Raborn put in some GI system requiring endless saluting of the boss. In truth he has gone to the reverse. CIA was never so little a one-man operation as it is now. The admiral has given to the professional operative who is his deputy, Richard Helms, a degree of power never before held by any man other than the Director himself.

Helms, in truth, actually conducts the day-by-day operations of the Agency. He sits as the CIA representative on the U.S. combined Intelligence Board. He, as well as Raborn, briefs Members of Congress. The admiral, in short, cheerfully acknowledges Helms' superior savvy as a career intelligence operative. Raborn's simple purpose has been to merge his own executive managerial experience with the intelligence expertise of Richard Helms.

The intelligence community is a small and at heart a closed community and the introduction into CIA of a seadog outsider undoubtedly did not sit well at first within the ranks. But the best information available now is that professional morale is high and not low. This, at any rate, is the estimate of men not involved in the Agency but with certain supervisory powers over it.

The admiral seems to have found a way of running a taut ship without making it also a martial one—and a ship, moreover, which can take on outside and purely civilian passengers occasionally with no harm to them or to the professional crew.

One other fact is perhaps worth noting: Not once in Raborn's regime has CIA been caught napping in any major outbreak of trouble for us around the world.

One of his creations, a new form of special intelligence task force for "special needs," involving senior operations officers from all arms of American intelligence, is on 24-hour watch in every critical area of the earth. The busiest at the moment is Task Force Vietnam—but Task Force Vietnam is not alone.

These special forces serve with far more coldly objective minds—as does the CIA collectively—than is commonly thought by eager critics. Still, nobody is naive enough to suppose that the best possible work will totally free CIA of the instinctive skepticism and sometimes outright hostility of a public which has a healthy suspicion of secret establishments and an immense appetite for melodramatic spy fiction.

One of Raborn's central efforts is to reduce this skepticism, this hostility, by what in CIA language would be called the optimum possible.